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OPINION OF THE COURT 
________________ 
 
VANASKIE, Circuit Judge 
Arbitration has long played an integral role in settling 
labor disputes arising between employees and employers.  
Recognizing the effectiveness of arbitration in this context, § 
302(c)(5) of the Labor Management Relations Act (“LMRA”) 
explicitly requires employee benefit trust funds to include a 
mechanism for arbitrating deadlocks amongst trustees that 
develop in the course of fund administration.  This appeal 
features two such deadlocks, each involving a faction of 
trustees petitioning the District Court to appoint an arbitrator 
to break the stalemate despite objections from the other 
members.  The District Court declined to send either conflict 
to arbitration, finding that the trust agreement did not permit 
such an appointment.  We disagree, finding that both disputes 
were within the purview of the parties’ agreement to arbitrate.  
Accordingly, we will remand for appointment of an arbitrator 
in each action.   
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I. 
The Western Pennsylvania Teamsters and Employees 
Welfare Fund (“the Fund”) is a multi-employer benefit plan 
established under § 302(c)(5) of the LMRA, 29 U.S.C. § 
186(c)(5).  Section 302 aims to “deal with problems peculiar 
to collective bargaining” such as “corruption . . . through 
bribery of employee representatives by employers, . . . 
extortion by employee representatives, and . . . possible abuse 
by union officers of the power which they might achieve if 
welfare funds were left to their sole control.”  Arroyo v. 
United States, 359 U.S. 419, 425–26 (1959).  To accomplish 
this end, the section broadly prohibits employers from 
providing payments of money or other items of value to 
employee representatives.  Associated Contractors of Essex 
Cty., Inc. v. Laborers Int'l Union of N. Am., 559 F.2d 222, 
225 (3d Cir. 1977), abrogated by Local 144 Nursing Home 
Pension Fund v. Demisay, 508 U.S. 581 (1993).  The 
provision, however, does incorporate an exception for 
employee benefit trust funds that comply with certain 
statutory requirements, including mandatory administration 
by a board of trustees composed of an equal number of 
employee and employer representatives.  Associated 
Contractors, 559 F.2d at 225.   
 In compliance with § 302’s equal representation 
requirement, the Fund is overseen by ten trustees 
(collectively, the “Trustees”): five union-designated trustees 
(the “Union Trustees”) and five employer-designated trustees 
(the “Employer Trustees”).  While this arrangement assures 
that both blocks of Trustees maintain equal voting power, it 
also results in deadlocks where the Employer and Union 
Trustees uniformly disagree.  Anticipating this dilemma, § 
302(c)(5) of the LMRA requires such benefit trust funds to 
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install a mechanism allowing a federal district court to 
appoint a neutral party to resolve any impasse.  Accordingly, 
the Fund’s Trust Agreement specifies that “[i]n the event of a 
deadlock,” the Trustees “may agree upon an impartial umpire 
to break such deadlock by deciding the dispute in question.”  
(Case No. 16-1699 App. at 162–63, Trust Agreement, § 
3.15(a).)  If the Trustees cannot agree on an “impartial umpire 
within a reasonable period of time, then, either group of 
Trustees . . . may petition the United States District Court for 
the Western District of Pennsylvania to appoint such 
impartial umpire.”  (Id.)   
The Trustees now find themselves deadlocked on two 
motions: one seeking to approve payment of compensation to 
eligible Trustees for attendance at Fund meetings and the 
other seeking to clarify and confirm the eligibility 
requirements for Employer Trustees.  In each case, one half 
of the board petitioned the District Court to appoint an 
arbitrator to settle the dispute, and the opposing half of the 
board sought to prevent the requested appointment.   
A. 
The Trustees’ first deadlock centers on an Employer 
Trustee’s motion to pay compensation to eligible Trustees in 
“the amount of $600.00 per Trustee Sub-Committee Meeting 
and the amount of $600.00 per monthly Trustee Meeting, to 
be paid upon the Trustee’s attendance at [the] meetings.”  
(Case No. 16-1699 App. at 130, ¶ 17.)  The Trustees have 
unanimously voted to approve similar compensation on three 
previous occasions since 1989.  This time, however, all of the 
Employer Trustees united behind the measure while all of the 
Union Trustees voted against it, creating a deadlock.  The 
Employer Trustees sought to refer the dispute to arbitration, 
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but the Union Trustees initially refused, arguing that two of 
the Employer Trustees who voted for the measure were 
invalidly appointed.  After fund counsel affirmed the validity 
of the disputed appointments, the Union Trustees agreed to 
arbitrate the compensation dispute.1   
 As the scheduled arbitration drew near, another 
argument ignited over whether the Employer Trustees should 
be required to turn over income tax returns and other financial 
information pertaining to Trustees who might be eligible to 
receive the contested compensation.  The Employer Trustees 
ultimately declined to provide these records, and the Union 
Trustees responded by again refusing to arbitrate the 
compensation dispute, arguing that the Trust Agreement does 
not authorize compensation for meeting attendance.   
 The Employer Trustees initiated this action to petition 
the District Court for the appointment of an arbitrator to 
untangle the compensation stalemate.  The Union Trustees 
sought dismissal, asserting that the Trust Agreement does not 
authorize the payment of compensation to Trustees, and so 
any decision by an arbitrator would exceed his or her 
authority under § 3.15(b) of the Trust Agreement.  The 
Employer Trustees followed with a motion for partial 
summary judgment contending that the Trust Agreement can 
be read to allow such payments, and that an arbitrator should 
break the impasse.  Upon consideration, the District Court 
agreed that the Trust Agreement did not authorize payment of 
compensation and ordered the action dismissed with 
prejudice.  A timely appeal followed.   
                                              
1 This dispute plays a central role in the second 
deadlock, described below. 
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B. 
The second deadlock arises tangentially from the 
compensation dispute.  As mentioned, the Union Trustees 
initially refused to arbitrate the compensation conflict on the 
ground that two of the Employer Trustees who voted on the 
compensation motion were invalidly appointed.  A 
disagreement ensued over whether an Employer Trustee 
“must be a full-time employee of a contributing employer to 
the fund.”  (Case No. 16-3359 App. at 307.)  One of the 
Union Trustees moved to “clarify and amend” the Trust 
Agreement to provide this requirement.  (Id.)  As expected, 
the vote on this motion deadlocked, and the Employer 
Trustees refused to arbitrate because § 3.15(b) of the Trust 
Agreement prohibits an arbitrator from “chang[ing] or 
modify[ing]” the Agreement.   
Several months later, the same Union Trustee raised a 
very similar motion, seeking “to clarify and confirm that the 
Trust Agreement requires that all Employer Trustees must be 
a full time employee of a contributing employer to the Fund 
in order to serve on the Board of Trustees.”  (Case No. 16-
3359 App. at 421 (emphasis added).)  This new motion stood 
in contrast to the original motion to “clarify and amend” the 
Trust Agreement.  The vote again deadlocked.   
The Union Trustees brought this action after the 
parties failed to agree to arbitration.  The Trustees submitted 
cross-motions for summary judgment, and the District Court 
ruled in favor of the Employer Trustees, finding that the Trust 
Agreement did not permit the Union Trustees’ interpretation 
of the Employer Trustee eligibility requirements.  The Union 
Trustees now appeal this decision.  Both disputes have been 
consolidated on appeal.   
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II. 
The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 
1331.  We have appellate jurisdiction over the final orders of 
the District Court under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We review both 
memorandum opinions and orders under a plenary standard.  
United Steelworkers of Am., AFL-CIO-CLC v. Rohm & Haas 
Co., 522 F.3d 324, 330 (3d Cir. 2008); see also Harris v. 
Green Tree Fin. Corp., 183 F.3d 173, 176 (3d Cir. 1999) 
(holding standard of review is plenary where appeal “presents 
a legal question concerning the applicability and scope of an 
arbitration agreement”). 
III. 
 Section 302(c)(5)(B) of the LMRA, 29 U.S.C. § 
186(c)(5)(B), serves the important function of ensuring that a 
mechanism is available to break any deadlocks that arise 
between competing factions of trustees in the course of 
administering an employee benefit trust fund.  As we have 
explained, the boards that oversee these trust funds must 
maintain equal representation of employers and employees, 
and frequent deadlocks between the two factions are a 
foreseeable result.  To address potential stalemates, § 302 
requires the two groups to agree on an impartial umpire to 
decide such dispute.  29 U.S.C. § 186(c)(5)(B).  If they fail to 
agree within a reasonable period of time, either party may 
petition a federal district court for the appointment of such an 
impartial umpire. Id.  Incorporating these requirements, the 
Trust Agreement at issue permits “either group of Trustees     
. . . [to] petition the United States District Court for the 
Western District of Pennsylvania to appoint such impartial 
umpire.”  (Case No. 16-1699 App. at 162–63, Trust 
Agreement, § 3.15(a).)   
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 In both of the deadlocked motions before us on appeal, 
arbitrability is the key issue.  In analyzing the arbitrability of 
a dispute, we are guided by several long established 
principles: 
First, “‘arbitration is a matter of contract and a 
party cannot be required to submit to arbitration 
any dispute which he [or she] has not agreed so 
to submit.’”   
Second, “[u]nless the parties clearly and 
unmistakably provide otherwise, the question of 
whether the parties agreed to arbitrate is to be 
decided by the court, not the arbitrator.”   
Third, “in deciding whether the parties have 
agreed to submit a particular grievance to 
arbitration, a court is not to rule on the potential 
merits of the underlying claims.”   
Fourth, . . . “where the contract contains an 
arbitration clause, there is a presumption of 
arbitrability in the sense that ‘[a]n order to 
arbitrate the particular grievance should not be 
denied unless it may be said with positive 
assurance that the arbitration clause is not 
susceptible of an interpretation that covers the 
asserted dispute.  Doubts should be resolved in 
favor of coverage.’” 
United Steelworkers of Am., AFL-CIO-CLC v. Lukens Steel 
Co., Div. of Lukens, 969 F.2d 1468, 1473–74 (3d Cir. 1992) 
(citations omitted) (reformatted); see AT & T Techs., Inc. v. 
Commc’ns Workers of Am., 475 U.S. 643, 648 (1986).  With 
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these principles in mind, we examine the disputed motions 
individually.   
A. 
 We begin with the compensation impasse.  The Union 
Trustees argue that the Trust Agreement does not permit the 
Trustees to authorize payment of compensation to eligible 
members for meeting attendance.  In their view, a decision by 
an arbitrator to allow such compensation would be 
tantamount to an amendment of the Trust Agreement—an 
action explicitly prohibited by the terms of the document.  
(Case No. 16-1699 App. at 163, Trust Agreement, § 3.15(b) 
(“The impartial umpire shall have no jurisdiction or authority 
to change or modify the provisions of th[e] Trust 
Agreement . . . .”).)  The District Court did not believe the 
power to authorize such compensation existed within the 
framework of the Trust Agreement and declined to appoint an 
arbitrator on that basis.  We disagree and find that the District 
Court viewed this dispute from the wrong angle.   
1. 
At its core, the compensation deadlock is a dispute 
over proper interpretation of the Trust Agreement.  The 
Employer Trustees’ motion specifically sought to pay 
compensation to eligible Trustees in “the amount of $600.00 
per Trustee Sub-Committee Meeting and the amount of 
$600.00 per monthly Trustee Meeting, to be paid upon the 
Trustee’s attendance at [the] meetings.”  (Case No. 16-1699 
App. at 130, ¶ 17.)  The Union Trustees assert that no such 
compensation is authorized under the terms of the Trust 
Agreement.   
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The Trust Agreement provides the Trustees with the 
“power and authority to use and apply the Trust Fund” for the 
enumerated purposes, including 
[t]o pay or provide for the payment of all 
reasonable and necessary expenses . . . (ii) of 
administering the affairs of this Health and 
Welfare Fund, including the employment of 
such administrative, legal, expert and clerical 
assistance, the purchase of such premises, 
materials, supplies and equipment and the 
performance of such other acts, as the Trustees, 
in their sole discretion, find necessary or 
appropriate in the performance of their duties; 
and (iii) of reimbursement for expenses and the 
payment of allowances properly and actually 
incurred in the performance of their duties with 
the Health and Welfare Fund, as permitted by 
law including, without limitation, attendance at 
meetings and other functions of the Board of 
Trustees or its committees or while on the 
business of the Board of Trustees, and 
attendance at institutes, seminars, conferences 
or workshops for or on behalf of the Health and 
Welfare Fund.   
(Case No. 16-1699 App. at 61–62, Trust Agreement, § 4.2.)  
The District Court waded into the weeds of the parties’ 
competing interpretations on its way to determining that the 
Trust Agreement did not permit payment of compensation for 
meeting attendance.   But the District Court did not need to go 
so far in its reasoning because the presumption in favor of 
arbitration prevails here.   
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Arbitration is a creature of contract, and “a party 
cannot be required to submit to arbitration any dispute which 
he has not agreed so to submit.”  AT & T Techs., 475 U.S. at 
648 (1986) (quoting United Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior & 
Gulf Nav. Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582 (1960)).  But where the 
parties “have agreed to arbitrate some matters pursuant to an 
arbitration clause, the ‘law’s permissive policies in respect to 
arbitration’ counsel that ‘any doubts concerning the scope of 
arbitral issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration.’”  
Granite Rock Co. v. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 561 U.S. 287, 
298 (2010) (quoting First Options of Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 
U.S. 938, 945 (1995)) (emphasis in original).  Thus, “in the 
absence of any express provision excluding a particular 
grievance from arbitration,” the Supreme Court has explained 
that “only the most forceful evidence of a purpose to exclude 
the claim from arbitration can prevail.”  AT & T Techs., Inc., 
475 U.S. at 650.   
 The Trust Agreement specifically provides that “the 
Trustees shall have full and exclusive authority to determine 
all questions or controversies . . . arising . . . in connection 
with [the Fund] or the operation thereof” including questions 
of “construction of the provisions of this Trust Agreement 
and the terms used herein.”  (Case No. 16-3359 App. at 69–
70.)  This dispute over the proper interpretation of the Trust 
Agreement is well-within the power of the Trustees to decide, 
and because the presumption of arbitrability applies, we 
presume it is also within the mandate of the arbitrator to break 
this deadlock.  Any concern that such a decision by the 
arbitrator would be equivalent to an amendment is misplaced, 
as interpretation of the language of an agreement is not an 
amendment of that agreement.   
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2. 
The Union Trustees assert that the deadlock must also 
fall within the scope of the LMRA.  The jurisdiction of a 
district court to appoint an impartial umpire under the LMRA 
is restricted to matters involving deadlocks in the 
“administration” of the trust fund.  29 U.S.C. § 186(c)(5)(B); 
Farmer v. Fisher, 586 F.2d 1226, 1229 (8th Cir. 1978).  The 
Union Trustees argue that the compensation dispute does not 
concern the administration of the Fund and thus the District 
Court lacked jurisdiction. 
While we have not yet ruled on what matters constitute 
fund administration under § 302,2 we need not reach the 
                                              
2 Our sister circuits that have considered the issue have 
taken varying approaches.  The Second Circuit has interpreted 
“administration” to encompass all issues that the trust 
agreement empowers the trustees to decide.  Mahoney v. 
Fisher, 277 F.2d 5, 6 (2d Cir. 1960); Barrett v. Miller, 276 
F.2d 429, 431 (2d Cir. 1960).  The only dispute that would 
not fall within this broad definition of administration is one 
which exceeds the powers of the trustees under the 
agreement.   
By contrast, the Eighth Circuit in Farmer v. Fisher, 
viewed administration as those decisions which relate to day-
to-day management of a trust, but not to extraordinary 
matters.  586 F.2d at 1229.  The Tenth Circuit has similarly 
distinguished between ordinary and extraordinary matters in 
the course of determining that a deadlock involving a 
resolution to amend a trust agreement was not a matter of 
administration.  See Ader v. Hughes, 570 F.2d 303 (10th Cir. 
1978).   
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question here.   We have stated before in a similar context 
that “the Trust Agreement may expand the jurisdiction of the 
Umpire beyond that required by section 302.”  Struble v. N.J. 
Brewery Employees’ Welfare Trust Fund, 732 F.2d 325, 335 
(3d Cir. 1984).  Because we find that the parties agreed to 
arbitrate such deadlocks over the proper interpretation of the 
terms of the agreement, there is no need to look to the LMRA 
for jurisdiction.   
B. 
 The parties also find themselves deadlocked over a 
motion by the Union Trustees to “clarify and confirm” 
whether the Trust Agreement requires Employer Trustees to 
be full-time employees of an employer.  In what appears to 
have been an attempt to have two or more of the Employer 
Trustees who voted for the compensation measure 
disqualified as invalidly appointed, the Union Trustees 
initially proposed a motion to “clarify and amend” the Trust 
Agreement to encompass its theory of Employer Trustee 
eligibility requirements.  The motion deadlocked, and the 
Employer Trustees refused to arbitrate.  But the motion for 
which the Union Trustees now seek the appointment of an 
____________________ 
The approaches of the Eighth and Tenth Circuits are 
narrower than that of the Second Circuit because there may 
be actions deemed “extraordinary” that would nonetheless fall 
within the trustees’ powers under the trust agreement.2  See, 
e.g., Farmer, 506 F.2d at 1230 n.5 (“rights and powers of the 
trustees unrelated to day-to-day management of the trust 
funds are not commensurate with ‘administration’ as used in 
§ 302(c)(5)(B)”).     
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arbitrator seeks to “clarify and confirm” the Employer 
Trustee eligibility requirements rather than to “clarify and 
amend.”  Specifically, the Union Trustees’ motion aims “to 
clarify and confirm that the trust document requires that all 
Employer Trustees must be a full time employee of a 
contributing employer to the Fund.”  (Case No. 16-3359 App. 
at 97, 208.)   
 The District Court set out to determine whether the 
Union Trustees’ interpretation of the Employer Trustee 
eligibility requirements was tenable under the Trust 
Agreement, ultimately concluding that the contract could not 
support such an interpretation.  The District Court also found 
that the Union Trustees’ initial motion to “clarify and amend” 
the Trust Agreement essentially acknowledged that the 
Agreement, as drafted, does not require Employer Trustees to 
be employed by a contributing employer.  Because the Trust 
Agreement, in the District Court’s view, did not support the 
requirements that the Union Trustees suggested, it concluded 
that an arbitrator would be required to amend the agreement 
in order to find in the Union Trustees’ favor, in derogation of 
the Trust Agreement’s explicit prohibition that the arbitrator 
may not amend its terms.   
We find, however, that the District Court misconstrued 
the effect of this motion to “clarify and confirm” the 
eligibility requirements for Employer Trustees.  The 
deadlocked vote seeks to confirm whether the Union 
Trustees’ theory that Employer Trustees must be full-time 
employees of a contributing employer is a proper 
interpretation of the terms of the Trust Agreement.  This is a 
matter of contractual interpretation, and as we explained with 
regard to the compensation deadlock, the Trust Agreement 
specifically provides that “the Trustees shall have full and 
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exclusive authority to determine all questions or controversies 
. . . arising . . . in connection with [the Fund] or the operation 
thereof” including questions of “construction of the 
provisions of this Trust Agreement and the terms used 
herein.”  (Case No. 16-3359 App. at 69–70.)   Thus, the 
presumption in favor of arbitration counsels the appointment 
of an arbitrator. 
The motion to “clarify and confirm” is not equivalent 
to a motion to “clarify and amend.”  A motion to “clarify and 
confirm,” as we understand it, seeks to have an arbitrator 
construe the agreement to determine whether the Union 
Trustees’ interpretation is correct.  A motion to “clarify and 
amend” takes the added step of asking the arbitrator to amend 
the agreement to reflect the Union Trustees’ proposed 
interpretation.  Contrary to the holding of the District Court, 
no decision by an arbitrator on this motion to “clarify and 
confirm” would lead to the amendment of the Trust 
Agreement.  The arbitrator will either agree or disagree that 
the Union Trustees’ interpretation is proper and supported by 
the text of the Trust Agreement.  Put succinctly, the arbitrator 
will construe the language of the agreement—a power 
provided to the Trustees in the Trust Agreement—and will go 
no further.  Interpretation is not amendment.  It is not the 
District Court’s place to determine the outcome of an issue 
that the parties agreed to arbitrate when the parties merely 
seek to appoint an arbitrator.   
V. 
 For the foregoing reasons, the District Court’s Order 
dated March 1, 2016, in the compensation dispute will be 
reversed and remanded with the instruction that the District 
Court appoint an arbitrator.  The District Court’s Order dated 
 17 
 
July 15, 2016, in the Employer Trustees eligibility 
requirements dispute will also be reversed and remanded with 
the same instruction.   
